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the globe is "induced by the economic exigencies of the large modern business enterprise." 2 Underlying this view is a particular account of history. Individual proprietorships and small associations ("ordinary" partnerships) based around a small number of people, most of whom are actively involved in management, are adequate at a certain level of technological development but become increasingly inadequate as technology advances. To accumulate the resources required for large-scale, capital-intensive, technologically advanced industrial production, entrepreneurs have to deploy the economic form of the JSC, which aggregates the money of numerous people, most of whom are inactive and whose interest in the firm is purely financial. It follows that, in many sectors, JSCs are the "natural" organizational form for business and their global rise to dominance is technologically determined. So too, the argument runs, is the rise of the corporate legal form; to facilitate the formation and operation of these JSCs, an appropriate legal framework has to be provided. Ideally, JSCs need corporate legal status to give them a perpetual legal existence separate from their constantly changing memberships, and limited liability to attract the required amounts of capital from passive rentier investors who will not be actively involved in management. 3 Recognizing this, states have enacted general incorporation statutes that make these legal privileges freely available. If they had not, economic actors could (and would) have constructed a functional equivalent to the corporate form through private action using property and contract law. 4 Contrary to appearances, therefore, the creation of an appropriate legal framework for JSCs is not reliant on the public sphere, state interventions, or state privileges. States around the world have simply provided, as a matter of convenience, the kind of legal framework that private contracting parties could and would have constructed. These implausible claims, with their denial of the indispensability of public action, underlay the nexus-of-contract theories of the corporation that rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. These theories not only assert the fundamentally private and contractual nature of the corporation but suggest that existing corporate structures and arrangements, being contract-based and market-based, are a priori economically "efficient." 5 These claims about the efficiency of these corporate structures have been reinforced by further claims about the market disciplines imposed on corporations and their managers by increasingly open, global financial markets and the existence of a "market for corporate control." 6 In this way, it has come to be argued that the global triumph of not only the joint stock corporation but, specifically, the shareholder-oriented joint stock corporation is economically determined. Indeed, this belief led two leading American corporate law scholars, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, to announce, at the turn of the millennium, "the end of history for corporate law." 7 Driven by global market forces, they argued, corporate law around the world was converging on a broadly uniform, Anglo-American, stock market-based, shareholder-oriented legal model. 8 The historic dispute between those favoring this model and those favoring alternative, less shareholder-oriented models had come to an end. In an increasingly globalized world, shareholder-oriented "British and American firms" had outcompeted their less shareholder-oriented rivals, generating a growing normative consensus that "corporate managers should act exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders." 9 The "bulk of legal development worldwide" was thus moving toward a "standard" shareholder-oriented model of the corporation, a development to be welcomed as "enhanc[ing] the efficiency of corporate laws and practices." 10 There are, this argument runs, certain "basic legal characteristics" which, for reasons of "economic exigency," "corporate law everywhere" has, "of necessity, [to] latter, of course, ensuring shareholder primacy. 11 From these perspectives, corporate governance is a simple "agency problem"-that is, how do you get manager-agents to act in the interests of their shareholder/investorowner-principals?-and international agencies are fully justified in promoting the global adoption of something resembling the AngloAmerican, shareholder-oriented, stock-market-based model of the corporation.
In asserting the fundamentally private, contractual, and market-based nature of corporations, these economically determinist accounts of history lend support to an approach to corporate governance that is not only proshareholder but supportive of voluntarism, private authority and (self-) regulation, and ostensibly hostile to public intervention. Equally important, these accounts serve to naturalize and depoliticize the corporate form as currently constituted and to entrench, as universal economic common-sense, a conception of the joint stock corporation as a "naturally" shareholder-oriented, private enterprise. The effect is to place the corporate form largely beyond critical consideration and evaluation, let alone alteration.
This article questions these accounts, arguing that hidden behind what has been dressed up as economic efficiency and necessity are interests and power; and that recent attempts to assert the fundamentally private nature of the corporation and corporate governance overlook the public origins of the corporate form and the growing dependence of shareholders on protective interventions by public authorities, at both the national and international levels. History shows, it argues, that the construction of the corporate legal form as currently constituted was initially driven as much by the political power of the rentier class as by technological necessity and economic efficiency. The same is true of its rise to global dominance. As many late nineteenth and early twentieth century commentators 12 recognized, the rise of the joint stock corporation contained two very different possible futures, reflecting the economic nature of the JSC and hybrid nature of JSC shareholding with its mixing of proprietary rights with creditors' privileges: one of these futures was characterized by increasingly "financialized" corporations, the other by increasingly "socialized" corporations. Corporate governance has, at different times, headed in both directions. A period of financialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was followed in the midtwentieth century by a move toward greater socialization, which has in turn has been followed, in recent decades, by another period of intense financialization. These shifts of direction, the paper argues, were driven less by efficiency considerations and more by changes in the balance of economic and political power. In this context, the recent re-theorizations of the corporation and corporate governance are best seen as ideological attempts to legitimate, by "re-privatizing" the corporation, the governance practices, which have emerged across the globe in recent decades, with their renewed prioritization of the rentier interest. These re-theorizations, the paper concludes are paradoxical given the sharper contradiction between the continuing private appropriation of corporate surpluses and growing reliance on private regulatory authority, and the increasingly social and transnational character of production and growing volume of "public" interventions needed at both the national and international levels to protect rentier investors.
II. THE JOINT STOCK COMPANY AND THE CORPORATE LEGAL FORM
To understand these historical twists and turns, we need to focus as much on the economic, joint stock aspects of the joint stock corporation as on its legal corporate aspects. We need, in other words, to keep reminding ourselves that joint stock corporations are incorporated JSCs with very particular economic and legal characteristics. Adam Smith identified the JSC's distinguishing features when he contrasted them with the "private co-partneries" that dominated productive activity at the time he was writing. 13 The ideally typical partnership was based around a small number of closely related individuals who were active participants in the firm. In law, this was reflected in the key principles of the law of partnership: mutual agency, joint asset ownership, and joint and several unlimited liability. These principles were considered to be consonant with the principles of morality and the market. 14 By contrast, the ideally typical JSC centered on a capital fund rather than particular people; it had many more members, most of whom were inactive, their interest in the firm being largely, if not wholly, financial. JSC "proprietors," Smith wrote, "seldom pretend to understand any thing of the business of the company; and . . . give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half yearly or yearly dividend, as the directors think proper to make to them." 15 As this suggests, JSCs were vehicles not only for productive activity but for passive rentier investment. It followed that they were characterized by a JSCs did manage to acquire corporate privileges (which was not easy), they acquired a quasi-public character and tended to be viewed "through the prism of the large state-favoured corporation" and to be "associated with privilege and monopoly, inefficiency and 'Old Corruption.'" 18 Smith's ideas about the JSC were highly influential and shaped state policy in the United Kingdom well into the nineteenth century. As the number of firms with larger memberships, rentier investors, and delegated management grew, corporate privileges continued to be granted sparingly, forcing many JSCs to operate as unincorporated concerns. In the United States, by contrast, capital was less abundant and states were much more willing to grant corporate privileges to encourage rentier investment and foster development. 19 This underlay the terminological differences that emerged between the two jurisdictions. In late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Britain, some newly formed JSCs were able to acquire corporate privileges but many could not. As a result, when Charles Wordsworth wrote the first book on "company law" in 1836, incorporated JSCs. 20 The term "company law" thus emerged as an abridgment of "JSC law," meaning the law applicable to JSCs. 21 By contrast, in the United States, where corporate privileges became widely available much earlier and a wider range of types of firms and associations acquired them, the equivalent text, Joseph Angell & Samuel Ames's A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate, published in 1832, was organized around the corporate legal form and did not draw a sharp line between business corporations and corporations of other sorts. 22 The U.K. terminology, however, reminds us of the crucial link between the JSC as an economic form and the corporate legal form in the business context: both company law and corporate law were essentially developed for application to JSCs (or JSC-like firms) with passive rentier investors, a separation of ownership and management, and so on. 23 Neither was constructed with individual proprietorships, small partnerships, or wholly-owned subsidiaries in mind. As a result, understanding company/corporate law requires an understanding of the economic nature of the JSCs for which they were originally designed. , THE LAW RELATING TO RAILWAY, BANK, INSURANCE,  MINING, AND OTHER JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES (2d ed. 1837) . At this time, corporate status and limited liability were obtainable only by Royal Charter or Special Act of Parliament. Legally, JSCs that failed to acquire corporate status were mere (unincorporated) partnerships and subject to the principles of the law of partnership, such as joint and several unlimited liability. The JSCs operating in some of the sectors covered by Wordsworth (like railways) were usually incorporated; those operating in others (like mining) were usually unincorporated. The distinctions between private partnerships and JSCs, and between incorporated and unincorporated JSCs was also drawn in the United States. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, AS A BRANCH OF  COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE, WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE  CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW 107-08 (1841). 21. In the United Kingdom, the early (Joint Stock) Companies Acts were clearly aimed at JSCs, not "ordinary" partnerships, and for many years only JSCs or JSC-like firms incorporated. Indeed, from their inception, JSCs were associated with corporate status and privileges, even if not all JSCs were able to secure them. In the mid-nineteenth century, when incorporation and limited liability were made freely available, the link became even stronger, for thereafter nearly all JSCs were legally obliged to incorporate. For some years, therefore, in the business context the JSC economic and corporate legal forms became more or less co-extensive. Only toward the end of the nineteenth century and the rise of the "private" company did "company law" come to encompass all legally incorporated firms, irrespective of their economic natures.
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III. THE JOINT STOCK COMPANY AS A TYPE OF PARTNERSHIP
In empirical reality, in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the line between the private partnership and the JSC was fuzzy. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, many firms emerged with large memberships, a separation of ownership and management, and transferable shares. However, many of these firms were more like extended partnerships than fully-fledged JSCs, their shareholders often participating in governance and having more than a financial interest in the enterprises concerned. 24 Moreover, shares were not the liquid assets they are today: restrictions on free transferability remained common, and there were still no developed share markets. 25 These material realities were reflected in the tendency, which continued well into the nineteenth century, to regard all JSCs (incorporated and unincorporated) as types of partnership. 26 They were "public partnerships"-terminology that emphasized their quantitative rather than qualitative distinctiveness. It followed that in both jurisdictions JSCs tended to be seen as aggregations of individuals-as "theys" rather than "its." 27 Incorporated companies were simply the company's members merged into one legally distinct entity: "a collection of many individuals 24 united into one body," as Kyd put it. 28 In a similar vein, JSC shareholders were commonly seen and described as "partners." 29 These conceptualizations were reflected in Wordsworth's book, which depicted JSCs as large partnerships and saw them all as, in principle, subject to the law of partnership, incorporated companies included, notwithstanding their "confirmation by public authority." 30 In common with his contemporaries, Wordsworth tended to see companies, like ordinary or private partnerships, as essentially contractual affairs irrespective of their legal status. Acts of Parliament, charters from the Crown, letters patent, and other instruments of incorporation were treated as akin to deeds of settlement-as simply one of the instruments by which "the partnership between directors and shareholders [wa]s constituted and governed." 31 As this suggests, incorporation did not yet create an entity radically separate from its shareholders, nor did it provide anything resembling a fully-fledged alternative legal form for business enterprises. 32 For Wordsworth, incorporation seems merely to have partially displaced the operation of the normal principles of partnership, with the degree of displacement depending upon the precise terms of and privileges granted by the instrument of incorporation. Thus, Wordsworth presented the general principles of the law of partnership, highlighting "the rights of 28 31. At this time, instruments of incorporation were usually bespoke documents, those sponsoring the company commonly being intimately involved in the drafting process. When questions arose about the impact of the special powers granted to companies (of compulsory purchase, for example) on third parties, the Acts of Parliament incorporating the companies concerned were regularly treated as containing a contract between the company and affected third parties. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
32. As Samuel Williston observed, in relation to "the points which belong exclusively to the conception of the business corporation," as opposed to the conception of corporations in general, "the law [ 1780-1970, at 7 (1970) . Thus, Blackstone's coverage of corporations makes no reference to business enterprises. Before 1800, most corporations were municipalities, universities and the like, and the distinction between public and business corporations had not clearly been drawn. It is striking, for example, how marginal business corporations are to Kyd's treatise, see KYD, supra note 28; as Hurst says, he had "little to say, and scant authority to cite, concerning the use of the corporation for economic enterprise," HURST, supra note 32, at 7. partners or shareholders in a company between themselves" and "the mutual rights and liabilities of share-holders and third persons," 33 but noted the gradual emergence of rules specifically applicable to companies. He then sought to outline the derogations from these (partnership) principles in the companies (some incorporated, some unincorporated) found in different areas of productive activity, devoting separate chapters to railway, mining, banking, and insurance. He treated it as more or less axiomatic that joint stock companies, incorporated and unincorporated, were governed by the general law of partnership except in those important respects in which the latter had been "superceded" (sic) or "limited and restrained" by the granting of corporate privileges or by the judiciary. 34 John William Smith adopted a very similar approach in his Compendium of Mercantile Law, which appeared around the same time. For Smith, a JSC was "a partnership consisting of a very large number of members" and the rights and liabilities of these members "would be precisely the same as those of any other sort of partner[] did not their multitude oblige them to adopt certain peculiar regulations for the government of the concern, which are ordinarily contained in an instrument, called a Deed of Settlement, to which is frequently added an act of parliament passed expressly for that purpose." 35 Where a company existed under such an act, it "certainly differ[ed] . . . from an ordinary firm" but only to the extent provided by the act or patent; in all other respects it was "governed by the ordinary law of partnership." 36 Joint stock companies were thus "nothing but partnerships of a peculiar kind," and the law relating to them could, therefore, "conveniently be distributed under the same heads" as the law of partnership. 37 IV. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE JSC AND JSC SHAREHOLDING If the United States led the way in incorporations, Britain led the way in fully-fledged JSCs. The period from the 1830s saw the emergence of a growing number of ideally typical JSCs and a dramatic increase in the volume of out-and-out rentier shareholding. The driving force was the rise of railway companies that needed to raise enormous amounts of capital 33 by contemporary standards-capital which, in the United Kingdom, was raised almost entirely privately through equity investment. 38 The result was the appearance of JSCs populated by huge numbers of shareholders, most of whom were pure rentier "investors" whose interest in the firm was purely financial. This generated the emergence, for the first time, of a relatively well-developed public market for JSC shares. 39 In the United Kingdom, these changes in the character of the JSC and JSC shareholding prompted a series of changes to the law of partnership as it was applied to JSCs. 40 In 1844, incorporation by mere registration was made available, followed in 1855 by the introduction of general limited liability. 41 The effect of these legislative changes on the perceived nature of the incorporated JSC was considerable, for they turned what had once clearly been seen as legal privileges to be granted only where there were clear public benefits (such as developing the national economic infrastructure) into private rights. 42 A series of judicial changes were also made to the law of partnership as it applied to JSCs: the partnership doctrine of mutual agency was abandoned, the doctrine of ultra vires was reformulated, and so on. 43 The cumulative effect was to accommodate and offer protection to the growing (though still relatively small) class of rentier shareholders. In Robert Flannigan's words, a "sustained effort" was made "to design . . . arrangements that exposed passive investors to something less than the general liability of principals. 39. See Ireland, supra note 25, at 63-67. 40. In the United Kingdom, by the closing decades of the century, the law on JSCs, previously regarded as a branch of the law of partnership, had deviated so much from the principles of partnership that "company law" had come to be seen as an autonomous legal category in its own right. Crucially, as part of these processes, JSC shares were judicially reconceptualized as rights to profit-a new form of intangible personal property quite separate from the assets of the company. 45 This was a very significant change. Originally, shares in all JSCs, incorporated and unincorporated, were regarded as equitable interests in the company's assets and shareholders regarded, like partners, as having a direct proprietary interest in the firm's property. 46 In Bligh v. Brent in 1837, however, the property of the shareholders was conceptualized as money not assets, and the shareholders portrayed, like creditors and unlike partners, as transferring ownership of this money to the company. 47 The assets acquired by the company were then conceptualized as being owned, legally and equitably, by the company as a separate entity. Shareholders owned mere rights to "surplus profit"-personal property, irrespective of the nature of the company's assets. 48 The same reasoning was soon applied to shares and shareholding in unincorporated JSCs on the grounds that their economic natures were the same as incorporated companies. 49 The effects were paradoxical. On the one hand, disconnected from assets, JSC shares began to look less like the rights in rem of partners-"insiders" who retain ownership of a firm's assets and continue to carry the responsibilities and liabilities that go with this-and more like the rights in personam of creditors-"outsiders" who transfer ownership of their assets and cede responsibility and liability in return for regular money payments and a bundle of contractual rights. 50 On the other hand, the disconnection of shares from assets (including any real estate owned by the company), together with the development of the market the organization of investor-owned firms"; the governance structure of corporate law, which is aimed at dealing with "the basic agency problem between the firm's owners and its managers . . . is designed principally to effectuate the interests of shareholders as a class." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 33.
45. Ireland, supra note 25, at 68. 46. Id. at 53, 68. 47. This turned shareholders, at least in part, into lenders and, therefore, creditors, external to "the (asset-owning) company," though, crucially, they retained certain key proprietorial rights such as voting rights. Bligh v. Brent (1837) for shares, enhanced their transferability. 51 The result was that although they were now intangible and more contractual in nature, they had also become more exchangeable and more thing-and property-like. There were now two quite different types of property: the assets owned by the company and the shares owned by the shareholders. This enabled JSCs, incorporated and unincorporated, to acquire, in a much fuller sense than before, an existence as asset-owning legal persons quite separate from that of their share-owning shareholders. 52 One manifestation of this was a subtle change in the wording of the U.K. Companies Acts. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 permitted seven or more persons to "form themselves" into an incorporated company, clearly implying that the company was made of them. 53 By contrast, the Companies Act of 1862 permitted seven or more persons to "form a company" implying that the company was an object external to them, a "thing" made by, but not of, them. 54 The re-conceptualization of the JSC share marked an important step in the processes whereby shareholders were conceptualized as (passive) "investors" rather than (active) "partners." For many years policymakers nevertheless continued to assume (or hope) that shareholders would, at least to some extent, act like "owners" (rather than creditors) and monitor managers-a hope which persists to this day. However, gradually the rights and powers traditionally associated with "ownership" were delegated to directors, 55 though shareholders retained their residual control rights, so even if they could not direct directors they could still dismiss them. They also now benefitted from 51. So too did the provisions of the 1844 Act, which declared shares of registered companies to be personal property and transferable as such. However, the liabilities of former shareholders did not terminate on transfer, continuing in certain circumstances for a further three years. See The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110 § 66 (Eng.).
52. Some degree of separation of firms and their members had been made possible by "affirmative asset partitioning" whereby the property of firms had come to be treated as constituting a separate estate shielded to some degree from the creditors of their members as individuals. The ability of firms to become separate entities even in this limited sense, however, was (and is) limited wherever the firm's creditors are not confined to the members' property but can go beyond it to reach the members themselves. See S. J. STOLJAR, GROUPS AND ENTITIES 79-87 (1973 (1999) . The Times picked up on this as early as 1840, remarking that companies had become "means of making money" not only "in idleness" but "in compulsory idleness." TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 1840, at 4. limited liability 56 and the significance of this grew in the final decades of the century. Hitherto shares had generally been of high denomination but only partly paid up. As a result, shareholders owed residual liabilities to companies, albeit limited to any unpaid amounts on their shares (hence "limited liability"). The uncalled capital provided companies with a source of additional finance and acted as a comfort to creditors. It also meant that links remained not only between shareholders and companies, but, indirectly, between shareholders and the company's creditors. If a company's assets were insufficient to meet the claims of creditors, the company could try to meet those claims by levying a call on its shares to recover any unpaid sums on those shares from shareholders. By the turn of the century, however, the links forged by these residual liabilities had all but been severed as share denominations fell and shares became fully paid-up, a process facilitated by the courts and legislature. 57 By 1885, only about 32 percent of companies outside the banking, insurance, and finance sectors had shares that were not fully paid up; by 1913, this had fallen to just 5.4 percent. 58 The result was that the de jure regime of limited liability became a de facto regime of no-liability. Shareholders now benefitted in full from Adam Smith's "total exemption from trouble and from risk" 59 : all they stood to lose was the money spent on their shares. 60 By eliminating the remaining liability links between companies and shareholders, the rise of the fully paid-up share paved the way for the emergence of the modern doctrine of separate corporate personality with its "complete separation" of companies and shareholders. 62 Corporate shareholding became comprised of an unencumbered, free-standing right to revenue, entailing no responsibilities or liabilities, contractual or otherwise, to the company or third parties. Shareholders had, however, retained their residual control rights over this reified and depersonified legal entity, and this underpinned the emergence of the idea that the company/corporation was an object of property that they "owned." 63 Shareholders went from being the corporation to owning it. They had become both "insiders" with residual proprietary rights able to elect and dismiss directors and insist that "the company" be run in their exclusive interests; and "outsiders" who, like creditors (and unlike partners), had transferred ownership of their property to a separate legal person and become responsibility-and liability-free. 64 The peculiar nature of corporate shareholding is reflected in the difficulties lawyers have capturing the legal nature of the share. One of the most oft-cited definitions in the United Kingdom-that provided by Farwell J in Borland's Trustee v. Steel Bros. & Co Ltd.-seeks to encompass both the proprietary and contractual dimensions of shares. According to Farwell, the share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se . . . [It] is an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of various rights contained in the contract, including the right to a sum of money of a more or less amount. 65 Some have used this to foreground the contractual dimensions ("liability" and "covenants") of shares while noting their proprietary 62. L.C.B. GOWER, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 100 (4th ed. 1979). 63. This idea was strengthened by the retention by shareholders of the "residuary right in the things owned", the possessor of which tends to be seen as the "owner. dimension ("interest"). 66 Others, struggling with the same problem, have placed much greater emphasis on the proprietary qualities of shares. 67 Ultimately though, as many commentators have recognized, the rigid theoretical separation between shareholders (with rights in the company as well as against it) and debenture-holders (with rights against the company but never in the company itself) collapses in contemporary economic reality. 68 Moreover, the JSC share's mixing of insider and outsider rights, of proprietary rights with creditors' privileges, lies at the heart of contemporary corporate dysfunctionality and irresponsibility, for it gives shareholders residual control rights, which enable them to insist, as "owners," on "shareholder value maximization" without having to worry about how the revenues and capital gains are generated because, like creditors, they are not legally liable for corporate debts or wrongs. 69 As Harry Glasbeek has observed, corporate shareholders "have little financial incentive to ensure that the managers involved behave legally, ethically, or decently," because in law, they are "personally untouchable." 70 This has, of course, been only too evident in a range of recent corporate scandals and crises.
V. THE JSC: TOWARD FINANCIALIZATION OR SOCIALIZATION?
It was quickly recognized that the rise of the joint stock corporation was altering the nature of capitalism. However, commentators of various colors and persuasions detected in the corporate revolution two very different possible futures. The first possible future, rooted in the residual proprietary rights of shareholders, envisaged the emergence of increasingly "financialized" corporations and an increasingly "financialized" capitalism. The second possible future, rooted in the increasingly creditor-like nature of shareholding and increasingly social character of production, envisaged increasingly "socialized" corporations and an increasingly "socialized" capitalism. governance and, indeed, at different times have appeared to be in the process of realization. Consider Marx's analysis of the rise of the JSC. On the one hand, Marx saw it as a progressive development, which marked the beginning of the supersession of the means of production as private property. 71 The capital invested in JSCs, he argued, was "directly endowed with the form of social capital (capital of directly associated individuals) as distinct from private capital." 72 JSCs thus assumed "the form of social undertakings as distinct from private undertakings" in which individual private property was replaced by a kind of socialized property. 73 Echoing Smith, Marx also observed that in JSCs the "actually functioning capitalist" was transformed into "a mere manager, administrator of other people's capital," while the "owner of capital" was transformed into "a mere money-capitalist." 74 JSC shareholders received their reward in the form of interest, that is, "as mere compensation for owning capital that now is entirely divorced from the function in the actual process of reproduction." 75 Implicitly recognizing the diminution of the shareholder to something resembling a creditor, Marx argued that the rise of the JSC represented the "latent abolition of capitalist property," the "abolition of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself," entailing "private production without the control of private property." 76 Although for Marx the rise of the JSC epitomized the increasingly socialized character of production, corporate surpluses continued to be appropriated privately. In his view, therefore, the JSC thus highlighted the "contradiction between the general social power into which capital develops . . . and the private power of the individual capitalist[]." 77 Crucially, he argued, as management was handed over to "functionaries" and "owners" were rendered functionless, there was no reason why management functions could not be delegated to workers. This led him explicitly to link the growing number of JSCs to the rise of the co-operative movement and to suggest that both were "transitional forms" in the shift from capitalism to socialism in which capital would be "reconverted" into the property of associated producers, "outright On the other hand, Marx recognized that one of the immediate effects of the development of the credit system had been to combine small amounts of money into large agglomerations of money concentrated in banks who acted as "the general managers of moneycapital" 80 and the "representatives of social capital" 81 -of "capital in general." 82 This concentration of capital, he observed, had created a "money power," 83 a "financial oligarchy," 84 and a "new financial aristocracy." 85 In the context of the JSC he went even further, arguing that its rise had generated "gambling on the stock exchange" 86 and been accompanied by the development of a "whole system of swindling and cheating" in the shape of promoters, speculators, and directors-a "new variety of parasites," centering on "corporation promotion, stock issuance, and stock speculation." 87 Moreover, the "enormous centralisation" of the credit system had given to "this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner." 88 For Marx, then, while the rise of the credit system and the joint stock corporation had set us on a road whose endpoint he expected to be "socialization," the immediate effect had been productively dysfunctional "financialization." 89 Which, if either, of these two possible futures-one of increasing "financialization," already visible and present, and the other of increasing "socialization," present in a distorted form but as yet still largely latent-would materialize? Over the course of the next century and a half, the double-edged nature of the "corporate revolution" repeatedly surfaced, finding vivid expression in the debates about the nature of the corporation.
VI. FINANCIALIZATION IN THE ASCENDANCY
In the decades after Marx's death, the number of joint stock corporations grew, partly because of new technologies that demanded large-scale production but mainly because of the desire of firms to suppress the price-cutting competition resulting from over-production. 90 The decades around the turn of the century saw the formation of numerous trusts (United States), 91 cartels (Germany), 92 and Trade Associations (United Kingdom) 93 aimed at fixing prices and output. When these arrangements broke down, as they generally did, they were followed by mergers that created large industry-dominating joint stock corporations. By 1914, these corporations dominated many key industries; in the inter-war years they came to dominate still more. Thus, the rise of the corporate economy was driven as much by market subversion as by market-driven economic "efficiency." 94 Financial institutions dominated many of the joint stock corporations that emerged, and by the turn of the century the growing power of "high finance" was apparent, especially in the United States and Germany, where large swathes of industry were under the control of banks and financiers. 95 This period was marked by "the first financial hegemony." 96 In the United States, financiers like J. P. Morgan led the way, using a mixture of voting trusts, debt, and interlocking directorates to exercise de facto control over more corporations. Indeed, the growing domination of this plutocratic financial elite (the "money trust") prompted the Pujo Committee investigations of 1912-13. 97 his theory of "finance capital." 98 Hilferding analyzed the implications of the growing domination of German industry by a small number of banks and the fusion of industrial and financial capital. While recognizing the growing power and influence of high finance, however, Hilferding was one of a number of commentators who, echoing Marx, saw the rise of the JSC as evidence of the growing "socialization of production." He noted, firstly, that the sheer size and market power of these joint stock corporations endowed their activities, individually and collectively, with social significance, making it increasingly difficult to characterize them as purely "private" enterprises. 99 He also noted that their rise was leading to production coordinated more by corporate planning than free markets, a development which led later to the emergence of ideas about "organized" and "monopoly capitalism." 100 Finally, the corporation had undermined traditional notions of private property in the productive sphere. The tangible productive assets of industry were now increasingly owned by separate corporate entities and managed by professional managers, with most shareholders reduced to the status of passive and functionless holders of income rights: shares, Hilferding wrote, represented "creditors' claims on future production." 101 The rise of the JSC and "finance capital," he concluded, was establishing "socialize [d] production to the extent that this [was] possible under capitalism." 102 The problem was that the JSC and finance capital represented an "antagonistic" or "fraudulent form of socialization modified to suit the needs of capitalism," in which "the control of social production remain[ed] vested in an oligarchy." 103 He nevertheless saw their rise as progressive, for it "facilitate[d] enormously the task of overcoming capitalism." 104 By taking possession of six large Berlin banks, one could take control of the most important spheres of industry. The key was "the struggle to dispossess this oligarchy." 105 Although written in a different idiom, similar themes permeated the work of other commentators. For example, in Drift and Mastery, published in 1914, the American journalist Walter Lippmann argued that technological advances and the rise of the professionally managed corporation was "sucking the life out of private property." 106 Emphasizing the creditor-like nature of corporate shareholding, Lippmann argued that "the modern shareholder" was a "very feeble representative of the institution of private property," having no productive role to play and no responsibilities to discharge. 107 The "one qualification" for modern shareholders was the "possession of some money and the desire for more." 108 Shares had become "little more than claims to residual profits," 109 and shareholders "transient" "absentee owners," 110 who flitted "like . . . butterfl[ies] from industry to industry" with their liquid, mobile capital. 111 "Deprived of their property rights," shareholders were "being transformed into money lenders" with "a single motive" from whom it was unrealistic to expect a "high sense of social responsibility." 112 Lippmann believed that socialization was already becoming a reality. He argued there had been a discernible "change in business motives" 113 and a "revolution in business incentives." 114 Business and management were becoming "professions" akin to medicine, law, and engineering in which motives other than profit came into play. 115 It was true that "control ha [d] passed for the time being into the hands of investment experts, the banking interests," but that control was already being challenged-not by the "decadent stockholders" but by "those most interested in the methods of industry: the consumer, the worker and the citizen at large." 116 Not everyone was as confident. The American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen saw the large corporation as potentially progressive but was much less sure this potential would be realized. "Machine industry" and modern technology, he argued, demanded genuine "social ownership" and rendered the idea of individual property rights in the means of production hopelessly outdated. But while the rise of the joint stock corporation had facilitated large-scale production and the exploitation of the "industrial arts," it had also seen "industry," the technical processes concerned with the efficient production of useful goods, fall under the control of "business"-by which Veblen meant financial interests more concerned with making money than things. The result was that industrial processes were being managed not to maximize productive efficiency and output, but to secure pecuniary gains for the owners of financial property. 117 "The financial community," Veblen argued, had taken over ownership of the country's largest corporations and thereby gained control of "the usufruct of [its] industrial system." 118 This operated against the best interests of the community which lay in the "efficient management" of industrial enterprises and "unhampered working out of the industrial system." 119 Indeed, financial domination often led to the "conscientious sabotage" of industry, with larger profits from financial manipulation and the obstruction of production than from its facilitation. This led him to conclude that "business" had become a parasitic growth on industry and had become restrictive of further economic development. Having little faith in class struggle as a way of realizing the possibilities inherent in modern industry and technology, Veblen struggled to see how these vested financial interests might be overcome. 120
VII. TOWARD SOCIALIZATION?
By the late 1920s, however, Veblen's pessimistic vision was beginning to seem at odds with the economic trajectory of American society. During the course of the decade, equity ownership by individuals increased and became more dispersed, and the exercise of direct control by investment bank(er)s receded. 121 "The great mass" of American industry, Robert S Brookings argued in 1925, had been "almost unconsciously converted from a management based on an intensely personal ownership to a management based on an ownership widely distributed and therefore almost entirely impersonal." 122 The small investor found it "practically impossible . . . to keep in touch with, and exercise any intelligent control over, management." 123 like were gradually being replaced by more impersonal, bureaucratic forms of institutional share ownership. Veblen believed this marked the emergence of a "new order" of "absentee ownership." 124 It also marked a seeming waning of financial power. Although investment banks continued to prosper through mergers and acquisitions, and through holding companies carrying pyramiding to new extremes, it was their "last hurrah." The shattering effects of the crash and the subsequent depression weakened them. With corporate self-financing also increasing, there was a further shift of "bargaining strength . . . from the bankers in favor of the corporations." 125 The contemporary business commentator, Mary Follett, believed that management, "not bankers, nor stockholders," was becoming "the fundamental element in industry." 126 The journalist Lincoln Steffens agreed, writing in 1931 that "financial sovereignty" was "passing from the banks to the management of industry-the management, not the ownership." 127 Berle and Means were, of course, shortly to add empirical weight to this idea. As more commentators began to echo Lippmann's claim that management was becoming a "profession," the belief grew that corporations were being "socialized." By the mid-1920s in Britain, Keynes was arguing that there was an inevitable tendency for "joint stock institutions, when they [had] reached a certain age and size, to approximate to the status of public corporations rather than that of individualistic private enterprise." 128 The "tendency of big enterprise to socialise itself," he suggested, arose when "the owners of the capital, i.e. the shareholders, are almost entirely disassociated from the management." 129 At this point, managers became more concerned with stability and reputation than with profit maximization, and 134 Responding to Berle's defense of shareholder primacy, Dodd observed that the great majority of the shareholders in large joint stock corporations were rentiers with little resemblance to traditional owners, and argued that corporations should be seen as social institutions rather than private enterprises. 135 Indeed, Dodd suggested, this was already happening. "Public opinion" was making "substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as well as profitmaking function." 136 Corporate managers such as Owen D. Young and Gerard Swope of GEC, he argued, recognized that managers were "no longer attorneys for stockholders," but "trustees of an institution" who owed obligations to employees, customers, the general public, and shareholders. 137 The job of managers was "to administer wisely and fairly in the interest of all." 138 Dodd added that this socialization of the corporation was perfectly defensible if one took seriously the existence of the corporation as a separate legal person with interests of its own. 139 Some were content to allow socialization to continue to develop informally within existing corporate legal structures. Keynes dismissed the need for overt "socialization," arguing that the nationalization of 141 As a result, the classic liberal justifications for absolute property rights no longer applied. Corporate shareholders were "anonymous pensioners," whose personal identities were irrelevant "even to the concern itself" and whose "sole effectual relation to the enterprise [was] that of a fixed 'overhead charge' on its operations." 142 They were the parasitic owners of rights to receive a "free income" drawn from "the . . . product of the underlying community" whose interests were conspiring against the full use of the "industrial arts." 143 In Britain, these sentiments found expression in the work of the Labour Party intellectuals, R. H. Tawney and Harold Laski. 144 Tawney also castigated the inherently pernicious and parasitic nature of intangible financial property forms like the share, arguing, like Veblen, that the traditional justifications for private property rights were inapplicable to property forms of this sort which divorced gain from service, and reward from work. 145 Unlike rights to tangible personal possessions, which were "indispensable to a life of decency and comfort" and encouraged industry and initiative, these new property forms were not only "functionless" but dysfunctional, directing productive activity toward "acquisition" rather than "service to society." 146 These new property forms dissipated creative energy, "corrupt [ed] [] the principle of industry," and distorted productive activity. 147 To redirect industry along more productively rational and socially beneficial paths, he too proposed that shareholders be reclassified as creditors and their rights attenuated to release industry from financial domination and enable it 140 to be reorganized in more productively functional ways. Management should be turned into a "profession" akin to medicine and law. Harold Laski reiterated these sentiments in A Grammar of Politics, recommending an "alteration of the character of the owner of wealth into a person to whom a fixed dividend is paid," to enable production to be "infuse [d] . . . with that sense of responsibility it now lacks." 148 Despite his disagreements with Dodd, Berle too recognized the changed nature of corporate shareholding. The final section of The Modern Corporation and Private Property argued that the modern corporation had dissolved the private property atom in which possession and control were united, and undermined the applicability of the "traditional logic" of profit and property. 149 Corporations now involved two forms of property: one active, the tangible assets owned by the corporation and controlled by the managers; the other passive, the intangible revenue rights, "liquid, impersonal and involving no responsibility," owned by the shareholders. 150 Reduced to a mere "recipient[] of the wages of capital," 151 the modern corporate shareholder now resembled "the bondholder or lender of money," 152 from which it followed that it was no longer appropriate to view shareholders as the "owners" of the corporation. The "corporate revolution," it concluded, had raised "legal, economic and social questions" of considerable importance, the "greatest" of which was "in whose interests should the great quasi-public corporations . . . be operated?" 153 In the final chapter, Berle and Means outlined some possible answers, one of which involved developing an alternative conception of the corporation as a social institution. In becoming functionless rentiers, they argued, shareholders had "surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest" and "released the community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights." 154 The community was now entitled "to demand that the modern corporation serve . . . all society" and that various groups be "assign [ed] . . . a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity"; 155 shareholders should get only "a fair return" on their capital. 156 148. LASKI, supra note 144, at 203 The decline in financial power did not prevent belief in the existence of an industry-dominating "money trust" persisting into the 1930s in the United States. 157 By the outbreak of the Second World War, however, it was clear that the direct domination of industrial capital by finance, which some had seen as a more or less permanent state of affairs, had, for the time being at least, waned. Indeed, in the decades after the War, the idea that ownership and control had been separated took hold and became the basis of "managerialist" theories not only of the corporation but of capitalism as a whole. 158 Many thought that the rise of monopoly and oligopoly, replacement of market co-ordination by planning, weakening of high finance, disempowerment of rentier shareholders, rise of professional managers, and the strength of organized labor was leading to more "socialized" corporations. 159 Within a few years, some commentators were arguing that corporate management "no longer [saw itself as] the agent of proprietorship seeking to maximize return on investment," but as "responsible to stockholders, employees, customers, the general public, and, perhaps, most important, the firm itself as an institution." 160 By the 1960's, it had become common in both the United States and the United Kingdom for the representatives of business "to declare that industry owes duties to employees, consumers and the nation as well as to shareholders." 161 In practice, if not in law, the corporate interest was becoming less exclusively identified with the shareholder interest, and there were signs that corporate power, it seemed, was being exercised in a more socially sensitive and responsible manner.
The claims of the managerialists did not go unchallenged, however. Broadly speaking, two different critiques emerged. The first critique accepted the decline in shareholder power but argued that managers were exercising their new found power and discretion in a selfinterested way. The managerialism that had emerged was selfish and to professional managers, "the modern corporation, although the product of the capitalist process, socializes the bourgeois mind", "relentlessly narrow 161. GOWER, supra note 62, at 578.
"sectional" rather than socialized and "non-sectional." 162 The second critique denied the loss of financial control, arguing that the level of shareholding required for effective strategic control by minorities was lower than often thought, and that control by minority financial interests was widespread. The dispersal of shareholdings, it was argued, had made it possible for minority interests, using intercorporate relations, interlocking directorships and the like, to wield disproportionate power. 163 This second critique led to attempts to distinguish "legal" or "nominal" ownership (which was dispersed) from "control" and "effective" ownership (which was concentrated). 164 The empirical research undertaken during this period, although yielding different results and conclusions, cast doubt on some of the more extreme claims of managerial autonomy. It is hard to deny, however, that corporate practices and behavior-and the social outcomes they generated-had changed. In general, and ignoring the undoubted jurisdictional variations, Edward Herman probably got it about right when he argued that "management control" was a reality, but was "constrained." 165 Although one must be careful not to overstate, there is clear evidence that during this period, corporate governance was more "socialized" than before or since. Indeed, it is not coincidental that the decline in shareholder power and growth of more socialized corporate governance that marked the "managerialist" era corresponded with a period in which the labor and trade union movements were relatively strong, and in which social democracy, the welfare state, and Keynesianism were at their zenith. Piketty and others have identified this period as one which both income and wealth inequality narrowed. 166 It is not insignificant that this was also a period in which the existence of corporations as legal persons radically separate from their shareholders was taken increasingly seriously-and not just for liability purposes-and in which the corporate interest came widely to be seen as something rather different from that of its rentier shareholders.
Some continued to seek alterations to corporate structures, advocating the formal relegation of shareholders to the status of preferred creditors and dispersal of control rights among different groups such as employees. 167 In light of the apparent triumph of "socialization," however, others argued that as shareholders had been de facto disempowered there was no need for politically provocative attenuations of shareholder rights or nationalizations. Socialization, it was believed, could be achieved without radical changes to the corporate legal form. Managers simply needed to be educated to act in a socially responsible manner. Indeed, many believed that a more socialized capitalism-what Berle called a "people's capitalism"-was emerging. Some went still further, arguing that we were moving toward a postcapitalist society. 168 IX. "ORGANIZED MONEY" 169 AND THE RISE OF FINANCIALIZED GOVERNANCE It turned out that these commentators were mistaken. Although the key elements of the corporate legal form changed little, the decades since World War II saw the bundle of rights possessed by shareholders (and financial property owners in general) enhanced by the relaxation of the rules regulating the free movement of capital, modification of the rules on takeovers, and the emergence of new forms of investor protection. 170 Shareholder power was further augmented by the diminishing power of organized labor and re-concentration of financial property ownership in institutions. 171 Acting through their institutional representatives, shareholders have made better and more effective use of their residual proprietary rights to exert power in and over corporations and their managers. Moreover, the competition between these institutions for investment funds has grown, as has the competition within them between portfolio managers subject to regular market-based performance evaluation. At the same time, new kinds of financial institution have emerged-hedge funds, private equity firms, and the like-that are more interested in quick capital gains than steady long-term revenue streams. 172 The result has been not only an emphatic restoration of shareholder primacy-for managers the delivery of good shareholder returns has become an imperative-but the reemergence of highly financialized forms of governance. Indeed, because of the mechanisms through which it operates, the exercise of financial power is more effective than it was a century ago. Today, financial institutions exert power not only directly in individual companies but indirectly on the corporate sector as a whole through financial markets. 173 In other words, the power exercised by rentiers has become ubiquitous. Permanently under threat, directors have been placed under severe market pressure to maximize "shareholder value," knowing that failure to meet the expectations of money managers and a growing army of security analysts renders them vulnerable to removal.
The resulting managerial focus on share price has been encouraged and reinforced by new forms of executive remuneration involving share options and other performance-related bonuses. Aimed at re-aligning the financial interests of managers with those of shareholders, these forms of remuneration have made the ruthless pursuit of short-term shareholder value highly lucrative for executives. Since the 1990s, their pay has skyrocketed. These developments have also transformed the image of the ideal executive "from one of a steady, reliable caretaker of the corporation and its many constituencies to that of a swashbuckling, iconoclastic champion of 'shareholder value'" with little interest in the fate of other corporate "stakeholders." 174 established in American business schools in the 1920s to create "a managerial class that would run America's large corporations in a way that served the broader interests of society rather than the narrowly defined ones of capital and labor," have been swept away." 175 Unsurprisingly, the main beneficiaries of these new forms of governance have been rentiers. In the 1980s, the share of national income accruing to financial institutions and rentier owners of financial property began to rise across the globe. 176 In the United States, corporations abandoned earlier policies of "retain and invest" in favor of policies of "downsize and distribute." 177 In the United Kingdom, there was a marked upward shift in pay-outs from 13-20 percent in the 1980's to 20-35 percent in the 1990s and 2000s. 178 Additional financial gains have come in the form of higher share prices, with stock-market-focused managers engaging in downsizing, outsourcing, offshoring, share buybacks, and other forms of "financial re-engineering" to reduce costs (and wages), increase dividends, and push up share values. The result has been the emergence of not merely shareholder-oriented but highly financialized, short-term forms of governance, which show little concern for the long-term productive health of companies, let alone the interests of employees, communities, the environment, or society as a whole. Indeed, on occasions governance has descended into blatant looting and asset-stripping. The corporate legal form as currently constituted has made this resurgence of private power and these forms of governance possible, as the residual proprietary rights attached to shares enable the ruthless pursuit of financial gain without regard to, or any sense of responsibility for, either the long-term health of the firm or any "negative externalities." The corporation's financial performance may evidence shareholder value creation, despite the fact that the firm may have destroyed value when these externalities are taken into account. Responsibility for dealing with any deleterious consequences (lost jobs, lower wages, damaged communities, growing inequality, environmental degradation, financial meltdowns and the like) has fallen on statesstates whose ability to raise taxes to deal with the fall-out of financialized governance has been undermined by the practices of those The global rise of these shareholder-oriented, financialized forms of governance has been controversial. Not only is there little evidence that they have made a positive contribution to investment or productive efficiency, they have been implicated in a string of corporate scandals and collapses as well as in rising inequality. 181 Indeed, since the great financial crash even some erstwhile champions of "shareholder value" have questioned it as a goal. 182 Despite this, new narratives have been developed justifying and commending the reassertion of shareholder primacy. In other words, the re-privatization of the corporation and corporate surpluses in practice has been accompanied by attempts to reprivatize the corporation in theory.
The traditional justifications for shareholder primacy center on the idea that corporations are "owned" by their shareholders and should, therefore, be operated in the shareholder interest as a simple matter of private property right. In recent decades, however, the academic 182. Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric, famously declared shareholder value maximization to be a "dumb idea." Francesco Guerrera, Welch Condemns Share Price Focus, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/294ff1f2-0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac ("The idea that shareholder value is a strategy is insane. It is the product of your combined efforts-from the management to the employees.").
supporters of shareholder primacy have downplayed the "ownership" claims of shareholders and developed alternative, consequentialist justifications that center on the claim that shareholder primacy benefits society as a whole. 183 This claim is rooted in the belief that despite the oligopolistic nature of many product markets and seemingly nonmarket nature of firms, the rise of increasingly open, global financial markets and emergence of a so-called "market for corporate control" has subjected corporations and corporate managers to market disciplines which, theoretically at least, place them back under the market. As noted earlier, some have argued that globalization has brought different models of the corporation into competition with one another and the AngloAmerican, shareholder-oriented, stock-market-based model is outcompeting its less shareholder-oriented rivals. 184 Others have gone still further, however. The so-called "nexus-ofcontracts" theories of the corporation, which began to emerge in the 1970's, assert that existing corporate structures are the products of private contracts. 185 It follows that they are market-derived and, as such, a priori, "efficient." 186 Empirically, these theories are implausiblethe theorists involved have to engage in life-threatening contortions to discover the required corporate "contracts"-but ideologically they do the necessary work. 187 They dissolve the corporation out of existence, rendering corporate arrangements the alleged products of a series of atomized individual contracts and removing the need to resort to claims about shareholder corporate "ownership": the corporation is a mere "legal fiction," a matter of "convenience rather than reality," and no longer exists as an entity capable of being "owned." 188 With the corporation out of the way, shareholders are reconnected to the corporate assets and to directors, rending corporate governance a simple agency problem. This raises the question of how to promote director-agents to act in the interests of their shareholder-principals. Having defined corporations out of existence, these theories, of course, preclude consideration of their 187. See Ireland, supra note 5, at 144. 188. However, when defending limited liability-which they describe as "perhaps the distinguishing feature of corporate law"-they are compelled to resurrect the corporate entity. "Corporations," they tell us, "do not have limited liability; they must pay all of their debts, just as anyone else must." EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 12, 40. possible socialization. Thus the leading contractual theorists, Easterbrook and Fischel, argue that an approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of the corporation "removes from the field of interesting questions one that plagued many writers: what is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for whom? Social welfare more broadly defined?" 189 Their response to these questions is: "who cares?" 190 By implicitly denying any necessary role for the state (and the public realm) in constructing corporate arrangements 191 and by asserting the latter's tendential efficiency, this marketized account of corporate structures not only serves to justify and legitimate the retention by shareholders of their residual income and exclusive control rights and the merits of universalising the Anglo-American model, it casts doubt on the wisdom of state interventions in corporate affairs. The result of these retheorizations is an approach to corporate governance that is ostensibly hostile to public regulation and supportive of voluntarism, private authority, and regulation at both the national and international levels. This approach is reflected in the development of corporate governance principles and codes by private market actors at the national and international levels. 192 They have been issued by stock exchanges, corporations, institutional investors, directors, and international organizations, all with the support of governments. 193 The advocates of shareholder primacy have made additional empirical claims in support of this re-privatization of the corporation. They argue that the growth of private pensions has seen financial property ownership "democratized" so that more people directly benefit from the maximization of shareholder value: We are all (more or less) shareholders now. 194 The empirical findings of Piketty and other researchers, however, make it clear that despite the spread of financial property ownership, financial wealth across the globe remains heavily concentrated amongst the very wealthy and has become even more 189 196 The findings of the 2013 Survey suggest that these trends have continued. 197 The main beneficiaries of the re-privatization of the corporation have been this elite group of rentiers, together with the executive class and numerous financial intermediaries and functionaries. The latter have benefitted from a financialized "economy of permanent restructuring" 198 and from their role as the "agents of wealth defense"-the army of well-paid skilled professionals (lawyers, accountants and the like) who work to protect the property and incomes of the wealthy. 199 Indeed, the rise of the shareholder value corporation has not only contributed to the global growth in income and wealth inequality but welded these groups into a "new aristocracy of finance." 200
XI. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE POWER
Nowhere has the growing economic and political power of this new financial oligarchy been clearer than in the prioritization of "investor protection" as a policy goal. Paradoxically, because of the nature of financial property, in a neoliberal world of increasingly globalized financial markets, the achievement of this goal-including securing the continued private appropriation of corporate surpluses-demands more extensive public interventions. 201 As we have seen, extensive legal interventions were needed to constitute intangible property forms like shares as separate objects of property. With intangibles of this sort, the very object of property is a legal construct. This is most obvious with government bonds, but it is also true of JSC shares which no longer confer any direct proprietary interest in a company's assets while the company is a going concern. Financial property is composed of transferable rights to receive income streams, such as dividends and interest payments. Crucially, extensive legal interventions are also needed to preserve the integrity of property whose value is derived from expectations about the returns that will accrue to it in the future. Assessing the value of shares inevitably involves speculation, for the returns accruing to them are not specified in advance. Moreover, expectations about future returns can be manipulated. Thus, protecting the integrity of financial property requires a wide range of legal interventions to try to eliminate deceit and swindling, and to ensure that its market value reflects its future income-generating potential with reasonable accuracy. This is reflected in the many and varied sources of rules protecting investors found in company, security, bankruptcy, takeover, and competition laws, as well as in stock exchange regulations and accounting standards.
The vulnerability of intangible financial property extends beyond this, however. Because its value is derived from anticipated future revenues, financial property is potentially affected by any changes in the social processes through which the income streams are generated. The returns accruing to shares, for example, are potentially affected by everything from changes in labor and corporate laws; health and safety 200 There is always a risk that the Staatsvolk will make demands-like higher wages, improved labor and environmental standards, enhanced levels of social spending and so on-that threaten the interests of the Marktvolk, whose wealth and power depends on the infrastructure provided by the state and taxes of the Staatsvolk. 202 How have the Marktvolk dealt with these threats? In recent decades, the growing power of the Marktvolk has been reflected in the development of new techniques to protect investors from the political threats posed by democracy. Numerous rules, aimed at offering quasi-constitutional protection to foreign investments, have emerged. 203 Actively promoted and developed by the leading OECD countries, this new "investment rules regime" is most evident in the gradual emergence of a complex, transnational network of rules for the protection of foreign direct investment, embodied in a variety of legally binding agreements. The goal is to restrict the ability of states to adopt policies that threaten to diminish investors' anticipated future returns without compensation by locking them into a "rule of investment law," which protects state action that might impair their investment interests. 204 The rules constituting the regime are negotiated away from the public gaze by technocrats, often amidst intense corporate lobbying. One of the most important aspects to this regime is the way in which it seeks to compel states to provide compensation not only for the outright physical expropriation of property but for the adoption of policies that have the effect of reducing the revenues likely to accrue in the future. "Regulatory takings" of this sort are regarded as tantamount to expropriation and widely seen as the most important part of the regime because of the restrictions they place on state policy. 205 With third-party investors increasingly acquiring standing to sue in domestic courts and international arbitration tribunals, states are now constrained not only by fears of capital flight but by the threat of litigation arising out of economic and social policies that negatively impact on future revenues. Since 2000, hundreds of foreign investors have sued states on this basis.
Because of the extensive protections offered by this body of rules to property interests-and thus to private power-and its constraining effects on government policies, it has come to be described as representing a "new constitutionalism." The aim is to establish rules which protect foreign investments and then to freeze them. 206 In this way, states are bound into the future, whatever political changes occur electorally. The "new constitutionalism" thus seeks to restrict the range of political possibility and insulate key aspects of economic life from democracy. The "states of advanced capitalism have to be constructed in such a way," writes Streeck, "that they earn the enduring trust of the owners and movers of capital, by giving credible guarantees at the level of policy and institutions that they will not intervene in 'the economy'-or that, if they do, it will only be to protect and enforce market justice in the shape of suitable returns on capital investments. A precondition of this is the neutralization of democracy. . . ." 207 In other areas, this dedemocratization has taken the form of the transfer of economic policymaking to "independent," technocratic institutions such as central banks, international organizations, and summit meetings.
XII. RE-POLITICIZING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The legal form of the business corporation was constructed in the nineteenth century to facilitate the formation and operation of JSCs and to accommodate and protect the rentier investors that populated them. Originally, the "public" dimensions of corporate status and privilegesand, therefore, of incorporated JSCs-were clearly visible. In the early nineteenth century, writes James Taylor, "while it was recognized that corporations sanctioned by the state for public purposes should possess [legal] privileges, the idea that businessmen should have free access to these privileges for private purposes seemed absurd to many commentators." 208 But with the enactment of general incorporation statutes, access to these privileges became a matter of private right and the public aspects of corporate legal status became increasingly invisible. The rise to dominance of the joint stock corporation in the advanced capitalist world in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, marked the increasingly inter-connected and social nature of production under capitalism. It also radically changed the character of the dominant forms of capitalist property and, as history has shown, foreshadowed very different possible futures. Corporations and corporate governance have at different times and in different jurisdictions taken very different directions-directions determined less by economic and technological imperatives and more by economic and political power. Thus, the radical re-privatization of the corporation that has taken place in recent decades has been underpinned by the declining power of labor and growing global power of capital, particularly in its financial forms. Re-concentrated in financial institutions, corporate shareholders and their representatives have been able to use their residual proprietary rights to shape corporate behavior. They have also managed to entrench an ideology that supports shareholder primacy and the continued private appropriation of corporate surpluses. Given the inherently financial (and rentier) nature of shareholding in joint stock corporations, we should hardly be surprised that the result has been increasingly financialized forms of governance, which are productively and socially dysfunctional. Nor should we be surprised that those who benefit from shareholder primacy continue to assert both the universal economic superiority of shareholder-orientated firms and the fundamentally private nature of these corporations and of production more generally-notwithstanding their obvious public and social dimensions, and the ever-growing dependence of rentier shareholders on state (public) interventions to protect their interests. What is surprising is that policy makers, in the teeth of the evidence, continue to seek solutions to the governance problems we clearly face by encouraging business self-regulation and further empowering shareholders. 209 The re-privatization of the public, joint stock corporation effected by the rise of impersonal, global financial markets is deeply paradoxical, for production has never been more international, social, and planned. A large proportion of international trade is now co-ordinated not by "the market" but by multi-national enterprises: it is trade internal to enterprises which takes place outside the market. 210 210. Contracts are made between the various subsidiaries making up an enterprise and although, legally speaking, they involve distinct legal entities, in reality it is the same mechanisms and disciplines are used selectively by capital to exert downward pressure on wages, taxes, labor, environmental standards, and social provisions, and to extract from governments policies congenial to the continuing private extraction of wealth. Indeed, private appropriation on the current scale seems not only to require more public interventions (at the national and international levels) but to be incompatible with democracy. It might also prove to be selfundermining, threatening the very social conditions that make profitmaking possible. The contradiction between more socialized and globalized production and continuous private appropriation has never been more acute. In this context, it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves of the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court defined a "security" for the purposes of federal securities law. A financial instrument is a security, they held, if it "involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 211 economic enterprise which is at both ends of the transaction. The prices paid, interest rates levied, and royalties agreed are governed not by market mechanisms and competitive negotiations between autonomous market participants, but by the enterprise itself. In other words, they are organized, planned and administered. 
